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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of -Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Repsondent, 
vs. 
iJOROTHY BEASLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11383 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted of the crime of grand 
larceny and her motion to quash the jury panel was denied. 
She appeals from both the conviction and the denial of her 
motion 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with grand larceny. At her 
trial, conducted in the Second Judicial District before the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, she was found guilty as 
d1aJOAd d ff t» an sentenced to a term o rom one to ten years. 
Appellant was placed on probation pending the outcome of 
'hi, lppea] 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction should be af-
firmed. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts as contained in the appellant's brief are ac-
curately represented with the exception as to the fact' 
established at the hearing of appellant's motion to quash the 
jury panel. 
The following is a more accurate representation as to 
the findings of the court in that matter: 
That the jury commissioners are invested with a 
"reasonable latitude of discretion" in selecting 
names for the jury list insofar as the persons se-
lected are ... competent to act and determine facts 
and apply law ... (T-288). 
That the persons selected must be voters and not 
merely registered to vote. And even if registration 
were all that was required, that selection could, in 
good faith, be nonetheless restricted to active vot-
ers (T-288). 
That while selection is to be made from the assess-
ment rolls, including both real and personal prop-
erty, a juror selected would qualify if he were on 
either roll (T-289). 
That a jury commissioner must ... select individ-
uals who represent a cross section in the sense that 
they cannot deliberately exclude any group be-
cause of race, creed or color, or age or wealth, other 
than that required by statute. But they have poor 
discretion (T-289). 
That when in the legislation they talk about persons 
who have been on the list before, they are talking 
about persons who may have served .... (T-290). 
That colored individuals are not underrepresented 
on the '68 list from which the jury was drawn (T-
290). 
That the poor reprentation of Spanish-American 
on the list was due to the small per cent who voted 
and that there was nothing that would suggest de-
liberate exclusion (T-291 ). 
That the failure to use the full assessment roll did 
not constitute prejudice in this case (T-292). 
Based upon the above findings, Judge Wahlquist con-
cluded that the action of the jury Commissioners was in 
no way prejudicial, and denied appellant's motion. This ap-
peal follows appellant's conviction and the denial of her 
motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY SELECTED IN THE CASE AT BAR 
WAS REPRESENTATIVE OF A FAIR CROSS-SEC-
TION OF THE COMMUNITY AND THEIR SELEC-
TION IN NO WAY VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION 
IN THAT JURY COMMISSIONERS HA VE BROAD 
DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN THEIR SELECTING 
OF JURORS, AND PREJUDICE WILL NOT BE PRE-
SUME'D IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF 
FRAUD OR CORRUPTION. 
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There is little question as to whether the appellant wd, 
entitled to a jury trial after having been charged with grand 
larceny. With this contention, the respondent has no argu 
ment. But the facts, as well as existing case law, fail to sub-
stantiate the assertion that the jury selected in the case at 
bar was not representative of a fair cross-section of the 
community. 
In the case of Ware v. United States, 356 F.2d 787 (D.C 
Cir. 1965) the court defined this so-called impartial jury: 
... trial by jury ... necessarily contemplates an im-
partial jury drawn from a cross-section of the com-
munity . . . . [This] mean [s] that prospective 
jurors shall be seected by court officials without 
systematic and intentional exclusion of any ... 
groups. 
According to the above, it is necessary to show "syste-
matic and intentional exclusion" of certain groups with1r. 
the community to defeat the presumed impartiality of the 
jury. The appellant, for lack of ability to show such ex-
clusion, was confined to making implications that because 
certain segments of society were "inadequately" represent-
ed on the master jury list, that arbitrary exclusions were 
necessarily the cause. 
The bulk of the testimony for the appellant, presentea 
during the hearing on her motion to quash, as well as major 
potrions of her brief, were for purposes of showing dio-
proportionate representation by minority groups on th' 
master jury list. 
The U. S. Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S 
202, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) has recently stated: 
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Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be a per-
fect mirror of the community or accurately reflect 
the proportionate strength of every identifiable 
group. 
This doctrine was further clarified in the same opinion: 
... a defendant in a criminal case is not constitu-
tionally entitled to demand a proportionate number 
of his race [or of any race] on the jury which tries 
him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit 
jurors are drawn. (Bracketed portion added.) 
In the case of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 797 L. Ed. 
469 (1953) which invoved allegation that the selection of 
jurors on the basis of property tax lists resulted in a dis-
crimination against Negroes, with the result that fewer Ne-
groes than whites, having regard to their proportion of the 
population, appeared on the panels, the Supreme Court, in 
holding that no discrimination had been shown, said: 
Responsibile as this Court is under the Constitution 
to redress ... jury packing ... it should not con-
demn good faith efforts to secure competent juries 
merely because of varying racial proportions. 
The Court went on to say: 
We do not think a use, nondiscriminatory as to race, 
of the tax lists violates the Fourteenth Amendment, 
nor can we conclude on the evidence adduced that 
the result of the use require a conclusion of uncon-
~ti tu tionali ty. 
In connection with the nonrequirement of proportional 
representation on jury lists, as well as juries themselves, 
one must recognize the universal doctrine that jury com 
missioners are endowed with broad, discretionary po'Ner~ 
in their selecting of jurors, and prejudice will not be pre-
sumed in the absence of a showing of fraud or corruption. 
This concept was adequately explained in the California 
case of People v. Hess, 234 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1951) wherein the 
court stated : 
In the selection of names to compose the jury list 
the jury commissioner is vested with full power 
to decide as to who are qualified to serve and who 
are entitled to be excused. Unless such selection is 
fradulently made, or made in such a manner as to 
deprive an accused of a fair and impartial trial, the 
jury commissioner's actions will not be invalidated. 
Elsewhere in that same opinion the court explained 
the light in which jury commissioner's decisions pertain-
ing to the selecting of jurors should be viewed: 
Furtherrnore, the actions of a jury commissioner 
in selecting and making up a jury list are presumed 
to be valid .. and in the absence of some showing of 
abuse of discretion by him his actions will not be 
disturbed. 
In the case of Wiggins v. State, 101 Fla, 404, 134 So. 
236 (1931) which likewise involved a motion to quash the 
jury because of irregularities in the selecting process, the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled: 
Commissioners ... have full power to decide ... 
who are fit to serve as jurors or whether certain 
persons possess the qualifications prescribed by the 
statutes and there will be no intt:rference with their 
decision in the absence of a showing of fraud or cor-
ruption. 
In showing the universality of the court's attitude to-
ward these discretionary powers, a Texas Court proclaimed 
m essence: 
The venire in a murder prosecution will not be set 
aside because jury commissioners selected some 
qualified jurors, but disreardged others where there 
is nothing to indicate any abuse of discretion lodg-
ed in jury commissioners. Walker v. State, 98 Tex. 
Crim. 663, 267 S.W. 988 (1924). 
And in the case of State v. PieI"Te, 198 La. 619, 3 So.2d 
895 (1941): 
The law does not direct from what source the com-
missions shall obtain knowedge of qualified ju-
rors or seek for names .... The law seems to trust 
the matter to the discretion of the commissioners ... 
In the absence of proof of fraud or designed dis-
crimination, it is to be presumed that the jury com-
missioners in making up the jury lists performed 
their duties within the spirit of the law, and wisely 
and well. 
Throughout these opinions one 1s overly conscious of 
the requirement of fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, 
or designed discrimination before the actions of jury com-
missions can be nullified or even seriously questioned. 
In view of the foregoing, it cannot go without mention, 
that during the entire hearing on the motion, a proceeding 
8 
that consumed nearly 300 pages of transcript, not a shred of 
evidence was presented which even hinted at fraud, cor-
ruption or designed discrimination. And :is far as the al- ' 
legation of an abuse of discretion is concerned, as the cases 
have clearly indicated and as the trial judge concluded, 
there was nothing to substantiate that the exercise of the 
jury commissioner's discretion was in any way abused. 
POINT II 
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF COMPLYING WITH 
STATUTORILY PROVIDED SELECTION CRITERIA 
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS IN NO WAY DISCRIM-
INATED AGAINST THE YOUNG, THE POOR, AND 
THE NON-PROPERTY OWNER. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-17 (1953) provides in part that 
the jury commissioners are " ... to select [names for the 
jury list] from the names of the legal voters on the assess 
ment roll of the county for the current year." From the 
face of this statute it is apparent that the young, the poor, 
and the non-property owner are in fact discriminated against 
as far as their being selected as jurors is concerned, but not 
unconstitutionally so. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has said: 
States should decide for themselves the quality of 
their juries as best fits their situation so long as 
the classifications have relation to the efficiency 
of the jurors and are equally administered. Our duty 
to protect the federal constitutional rights of all 
does not mean we must or should impose on state'.' 
our conception of the proper source of jury lists, 
so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-
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section of the population suitable in character and 
intelligence for that civic duty. Brown v. Allen, 
supra. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit has concluded: 
Neither statutory nor case-made law requires the 
use of any particular source of names so long as 
there is no systematic exclusion of the members of 
any race, creed, social or economic groups. Padgett 
v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Company, 283 F.2d 597 
(10th Cir. 1960). 
The above, when taken in connection with the Supreme 
Court's ruling in the Brown case, supra, and the universally 
recognized holding of People v. Hess, supra, which author-
ized the use of property tax rolls and voter rolls respective-
ly as sources of names of jurors, would clearly indicate that 
exclusion of the groups in question is not only constitution-
al but has been ratified by the most prominent courts of 
the land. 
It might be contended that the exclusion of the poor 
is nowhere mentioned in these opinions, but it takes little 
imagination to equate the poor with the non-property owner. 
It is also not inconceivable to equate the young, even though 
voters, with, again, the non-property owner. For while the 
appellant complains that few young people were included 
in the jury list, there is no evidence that such were exclud-
ed for other than valid statutory or discretionary reasons. 
It has been made abundantly clear in the area of jury 
selection that a state statute, even though improvidently 
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drafted or inappropriately administered, need not be con-
sidered violative of the constitution. As stated in the Swain 
case, supra: "An imperfect system for the selection of jur-
ies is not equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on 
race." 
By combining those exclusions authorized by state 
statute, those universally accepted in case law, and those 
resulting from discretionary powers vested in the jury 
commissioners, it is difficult indeed for the appellant to 
show unsanctioned discrimination against the young, the 
poor, and the non-property owner. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT 
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS DISCRIMINATED 
AGAINST P E R S 0 N S OF SPANISH-AMERICAN 
ORIGIN OR AGAINST ANY OTHER MINORITY RA 
CIAL GROUP WHATSOEVER. 
In conjuncition with those cases already cited which 
decry the notion of required proportional representation on 
juries and jury lists, it is felt that a special point should 
be made as to the appellant's allegation that persons rt 
Spanish-American origin have been discriminated against 
Aside from the implied allegation, for which there i; 
little support, that persons have a substantive right to serve 
as jurors, the appellant would have us believe that because 
those of Spanish-American orogin were not "adequately" 
represented on the jury list, that the jury drawn wa3 un· 
constitutional. In weighing the probability of such desii;neii 
exclusion, it is interesting to note the jury commisisoner'· 
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apparent ignorance as to which names may have been of 
Spani~h origin. Here again, as the trial court indicated, 
,uch other exclusion factors as property ownership and vot-
ing may have decidedly limited their participation as pros-
pective jurors. 
Two cases seem to be in point as to the questionability 
of ltmited racial minority participation on jury lists. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had 
the following to say: 
The mere fact that the trial jurors drawn from the 
list did not contain the various percentages of per-
osns of a particular nativity, does not show that the 
list itself violated the statute. Wong Yim v. United 
States, 118 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1941). 
In the Wong Yim case, supra, it appeared that of the 
panel of 35 jurors, 32 were American or of other Caucasian 
ancestry, one was of Chinese ancestry and two were of Cau-
casian-Hawaiian ancestry. The population of the citizenry 
of the particular island was in the following approximate 
percentages as to ancestry: 
American 
Hawaiian 
Japanese 
Portugese 
Chinese 
Part Hawaiian 
Other 
21-22% 
18-19% 
18-19% 
13-14% 
11-12% 
8- 9% 
5- 6% 
Perhaps the most striking case in point is that of U.S. 
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v. Hunt, 265 F.Supp. 178 (W.D. Tex. 1967) where a federal 
court recently held in assence: 
That Mexican-American constituted 15.4% of com-
munity statutorily qualified jury pool whereas jury 
panel was composed of 11 % Mexican-Americans did 
not constitute such disparity as to indicate discrim-
ination as to Mexican-Americans in selection of 
panel even though Mexican-Americans might make 
up 36% of the population of the community. 
Here again, federal and national standards along with 
a complete absence of purposeful discrimination, clearly 
indicate a lack of any imprcpriety on the part of the jury 
commissioners vis-a-vis the placing of persons of Spanish-
American origin on the jury list. And as a Pennsylvania 
federal court has said: 
A party moving to challenge the array of jurors 
and to strike the jury panel on grounds of uncon-
stitutional discrimination in the selecting of jurors 
has the burden of proving purposeful and intent-
ional discrimination. Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel 
Corp .. 100 F.Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1951). 
POINT IV 
IN THE EVENT CERTAIN IRREGULARITIES OR 
IMPROPRIETIES WERE EXERCISED BY THE JURY 
COMMISSIONERS IN THE SELECTION PROCESS, 
SUCH WERE NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE STATU-
TORY SCHEME NOR COULD THEY BE CONSID-
ERED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In ascertaining what degree of discretion is permitted 
the jury commissioners in selecting jurors, so as to in turn 
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be able to evaluate the consequences of any deviation from 
claimed statutory meaning, it is important to determine 
whether the applicable statutes are mandatory or merely di-
rectory in nature. 
The Utah Supreme Court on more than one occasion, 
State v. Dis.efano, 70 Utah 586, 262 P. 113 (1927), Meye,rs 
v. Second Judicial District Court, etc, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 
711 (1945), has held: "Generally, statutory provisions re-
garding drawing and summoning of juries are directory 
and not mandatory." 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has recently estab-
lished a similar interpretation: "statutory provisions for the 
selection of jurors are generally held to be directory and 
not mandatory." State v. Williams, 76 N.M. 578, 417 P.2d 
62 ( 1966). 
California, somewhat earlier, made a similar pronounce-
ment which is even more appropriate in the instant case: 
... the provision of [the] Code of Civil Procedure 
that names of jury lists shall be selected from dif-
ferent wards or townships of counties in proportion 
to the number of inhabitants, as nearly as can be 
estimated, is directory only. In the instant case 
there is certainly no abuse of discretion shown on 
the part of the board of supervisors in selecting 
the lists, and appellant has no just cause of com-
plaint, especially where a jury satisfactory to both 
parties was chosen from the particular venire. 
People v. Tennant, 32 Cal. App. 1, 88 P.2d 937 
(1939). 
Because of this generaly prevailing attitude that such 
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statutes are directory as opposed to mandatory, it is under-
standable why the majority of courts fail to be overly con-
cerned when irregularities are discovered in the actual se· 
lection process. 
In People v. Hess, supra, the court verbalized this ap· 
proach to jury selection problems: 
As a general rule, errors and irregularities in failing 
to comply strictly to the statutes in making up a 
jury list, when there is no resultant prejudice to the 
parties involved in litigation, does not invalidate 
the list. 
The Vermont Supreme Court has expanded this doct· 
rine to better comport to the factual situation presented in 
the instant case: 
When essential prov1s1ons of statutes providing 
for the selecting, listing, or drawing jurors are not 
complied with, this noncompliance can be taken 
ad vantage of by a challenge to the array or by any 
other proper plea or motion, but that errors and 
irregularities in making up a jury list do not inval-
idate it nor furnish ground for challenge to the 
array unless prejudice is shown to have resulted 
therefrom. These rules apply to both grand and 
petit jurors. State v. Groyet, 119 Vt. 167, 122 A.2d 
862 (1956). 
In all of the above cases it is either stated or implied 
that irregularities in the compiling of jury lists neither 
violates the statutory scheme nor render the jury and their 
verdicts invalid. It was concluded in the Hess case, supra. 
that: "A defendant cannot complain if he is tried by an 
15 
impartial jury and can demand nothing more." In this 
connection, it should be pointed out that the appellant had 
no contention as to the qualifications or impartiality of the 
jury who sat in her particular case. Her contentions in-
volved the jury list as a whole. 
In the case of People v. King, 30 Cal. App. 185, 85 P.2d 
928 (1938) a California court concluded: 
The appellants ... have attacked the procedure fol-
lowed by the jury commissioner in making up and 
submitting such trial jury list. No bias or prejudice 
on the part of the commissioner, and the only error 
claimed is in his method of procedure in compiling 
the list. Unless there be a material departure from 
the provisions of the statute which militates to the 
prejudice of a defendant, no error can be claimed 
in presenting a panel from which a jury is to be 
selected. (Emphasis added.) 
The highest courts of our neighboring states to the 
north and south have reached the same conclusion in cases 
involving attempts to quash the jury and its verdict. In 
State v. Walters, 610 Idaho 431, 102 P.2d 284 (1940), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held: 
On motion to quash a jury panel the burden of 
showing substantial actual or presumptive preju-
dice to the rights of defendant rests on the moving 
party and must be established by a preponderance 
of the proofs. 
The Arizona Supreme Court followed some years later 
with a holding which in essence went as follows: 
Where defendant made no showing that he was or 
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may have been prejudiced by the preparation of the 
jury list, the utilization of a jury list which had not 
been compiled in accordance with statutory require-
ment of "a list made of all persons within the 
county qualified to serve as jurors," which shall 
be revised from time to time "to keep it as compete 
as practicable," did not require a mistrial. State v. 
Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960). 
In conclusion, and perhaps most significant as being 
representative of Utah law on this whole subject, was this 
court's ruling in State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 
798 (1961) where Chief Justice Wade speaking for the 
court said: 
Prejudice is not presumed from mere error unless 
the natural effect of the error is to do harm. There 
is no showing here that the jury which tried appel-
lants was not a fair jury taken from a cross-section 
of the community in which they were tried, or 
that the result of appellants' trial would have been 
different. 
It was Justice Holmes quoting from People v. 
Jewett, 3 Wend. 314 in Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 50 
L.Ed. 899 (1906), who said, "Even when persons liable to 
jury duty under the state law are excluded, it is no ground 
for challenge to array, if a sufficient number of unex-
ceptional persons are present." 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent submits that the jury which tried the 
defendant-appellant was selected from a master jury list 
which represented a cross-section of the community to the 
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1xtent required by case as well as statutory law; that the-
;tatutory scheme of Utah governing the selection of juror 
was not violated, nor do such statutes violate the consti-
tution in any way. The appellant has failed to show that 
the jury commissioners were either arbitrary or capricious 
or displayed designed discrimination in their selecting of 
jurors. For these reasons, it is further submitted that the 
lower court's conviction and ruling on the motion to quash 
the jury be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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